Call for Papers: Dec 2009

Special Issue: Call for Papers

Implicit-Explicit False Belief Understanding

Guest Editors: Dr Jason Low (Victoria University of Wellington) and Prof. Josef Perner (University of Salzburg)

Submission Deadline: 1 December 2010

Method of Submission: all manuscripts (which should be clearly labelled as submissions intended for this Special Issue) must be submitted through the Journal’s own peer review system, Editorial Manager.

Issue Scope

False belief reasoning is one of the most prolific research topics in developmental psychology. There is accumulating research suggesting earlier sensitivity to false belief via indirect measures such as inspection time and anticipatory looking in view of persistent failure in traditional tasks where understanding is assessed with direct questions about an actor’s belief or erroneous action. The standard, mostly tacit, theoretical interpretations of this discrepancy are either that indirect measures provide early evidence of understanding which is masked by direct tests or that the earlier evidence is a methodological artefact or based on some simpler heuristics (e.g., "behaviour rules"). The implicit-explicit knowledge distinction opens the possibility that both kinds of evidence reflect knowledge but of a different kind. Whether this difference is best captured by the implicit-explicit distinction is, of course, open to debate.

For this Special Issue in BJDP, we invite researchers to submit papers that explain early-late false belief understanding with reference to implicit-explicit knowledge systems. Contributors may formulate their papers either by adopting the implicit-explicit knowledge distinction or by comparing alternative explanations with the implicit-explicit framework to explain evidence on early-late false belief understanding. Theoretical review papers and empirical studies are invited on questions which include, but are not restricted to, the following:

• Do infants implicitly or explicitly represent false belief states?
• Which tasks tap implicit and explicit understandings of false beliefs?
• Does the implicit-explicit distinction relate to automatic engagement of mentalising versus its reflective use in justifications of conduct?
• How does explicit false belief understanding arise from an implicit understanding of the mind?
• How do the growth of executive functioning and acquisition of complex language skills relate to the development of implicit and explicit false belief understanding?
• Could opportunities for social interaction and action build upon an implicit understanding of false belief to cultivate an explicit understanding?
• Is there any neurological data bearing upon distinctions between implicit and explicit false belief understanding?
• Does the ecological context of psychological reasoning matter for the evolution and development of implicit and explicit theory of mind understanding?

Other types of studies are also invited, including: studies on atypical developmental populations and comparative research with non-human participants.

Prospective authors should consult the guest editors if they are in any doubt about the relevance of a submission. All manuscripts will be sent out for anonymous peer review, following the usual procedures of the Journal. Authors should consult the Notes for Contributors for further information about submission requirements.

For further information about the Special Issue, please contact either of the Guest Editors:

Jason Low (e-mail: Jason.Low@vuw.ac.nz)

Josef Perner (e-mail: josef.perner@sbg.ac.at)